

**Hedge Funds as Risk-Transforming  
Instruments in Institutional Portfolios**  
*A Risk Budgeting Framework Beyond Traditional Metrics*

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# Hedge Funds as Risk-Transforming Instruments in Institutional Portfolios

## *A Risk Budgeting Framework Beyond Traditional Metrics*

### Abstract

Hedge funds continue to occupy a contested yet persistent role in institutional portfolios despite long-standing concerns over fees, performance, and diversification benefits. Traditional allocation frameworks evaluate hedge funds primarily through conventional quantitative metrics and benchmark-relative returns, often leading to misaligned expectations and ambiguous assessments of value. This paper argues that such approaches are incomplete and inadequate as a primary organizing principle for hedge fund allocation.

The paper reframes hedge funds as risk-transforming tools rather than a homogeneous asset class and introduces a risk budgeting framework beyond traditional metrics. Under this approach, hedge fund strategies are evaluated according to the specific portfolio risks they are intended to mitigate, reshape, or deliberately accept in pursuit of other portfolio objectives — such as volatility exposure, drawdown tolerance, liquidity risk, tail risk, and governance risk — rather than their behavior as measured by traditional metrics relative to traditional assets. Particular attention is given to governance-oriented and control strategies, which operate through governance as risk mitigation and are poorly captured by traditional metric-based models.

Drawing on institutional allocator practice and governance-focused investment contexts, the paper demonstrates how risk budgeting improves capital allocation coherence, strengthens fiduciary oversight, and clarifies performance evaluation. By shifting the focus from asset categories to risk intent, the framework meaningfully improves how institutions think about hedge funds and offers a more resilient approach to portfolio construction in complex investment environments.

**Keywords:** hedge funds; institutional portfolios; risk budgeting; traditional risk metrics; correlation; capital allocation; portfolio construction; governance as risk mitigation; alternative investments; institutional investing; risk management; investment committee governance; asset allocation frameworks

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## 1. Introduction

For more than two decades, institutional investors have debated the role of hedge funds in diversified portfolios. Hedge funds were initially embraced for their promise of diversification, downside protection, and the ability to generate returns independent of traditional markets. Over time, however, persistent fee pressure, uneven performance, and episodic correlation spikes — particularly during periods of market stress — have led many institutions to reassess their value proposition. Yet despite these concerns, hedge funds continue to occupy a durable position within the portfolios of endowments, pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds.

This persistence reflects an underlying tension in how hedge funds are evaluated. When viewed primarily through the lens of traditional metrics and benchmark-relative returns, hedge fund allocations often appear difficult to justify *ex post*. At the same time, experienced allocators rarely abandon hedge funds entirely, suggesting that prevailing analytical frameworks fail to capture important aspects of their economic role. The issue is not that traditional metrics are irrelevant, but that they are incomplete and inadequate as the main framework for making hedge fund allocation decisions.

This paper argues that hedge funds are best understood not as a homogeneous asset class, but as risk-transforming tools within institutional portfolios. Rather than simply adding or subtracting exposure to systematic risk factors, hedge funds reshape the distribution of portfolio outcomes through leverage, optionality, liquidity transformation, and, in some cases, governance mechanisms that directly influence underlying assets. These effects are difficult to observe through static correlation matrices and other traditional summary statistics, particularly across market regimes and stress environments where institutional risk tolerance is most severely tested.

To address this gap, the paper introduces a risk budgeting framework beyond traditional metrics. Under this approach, hedge fund strategies are evaluated based on the specific portfolio risks they are intended to mitigate, reshape, or deliberately accept in pursuit of other portfolio objectives — such as volatility exposure, drawdown tolerance, liquidity risk, tail risk, or governance risk — rather than their historical behavior as reflected in traditional metrics relative to traditional asset classes. While traditional metrics may be used to observe or monitor these risks *ex post*, risk budgeting treats them as *ex ante* allocation dimensions that reflect institutional objectives rather than retrospective measurements. In this sense, hedge fund allocation is fundamentally about allocating risk, not just capital.

The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it synthesizes institutional allocator practice across a broad range of hedge fund strategies, highlighting why allocation frameworks centered on traditional metrics often fail to align with fiduciary objectives. Second, it reframes hedge funds as instruments of risk transformation, emphasizing their functional role within the total portfolio rather than their categorical classification. Third, it introduces the concept of governance as risk mitigation as a distinct risk budget dimension — a contribution not fully developed in prior risk budgeting frameworks including those of Ang (2014) and Ilmanen

(2011), which address risk budgeting comprehensively but do not treat governance as an independent portfolio dimension.

The analysis reflects experience evaluating hedge fund strategies both from the perspective of an institutional allocator and within direct investing and control-oriented contexts. Throughout, the emphasis is analytical and descriptive, with the objective of formalizing a framework that aligns more closely with how experienced institutions already reason about risk — while offering a more coherent and explicit structure for decision-making.

*\*Throughout this paper, traditional metrics refers to commonly used quantitative measures employed by institutional investors to evaluate hedge fund strategies ex post, including but not limited to correlation, beta, alpha, Sharpe ratio, Sortino ratio, standard deviation, value at risk (VaR), expected shortfall, information ratio, capture ratios, downside deviation, and attribution frameworks such as Brinson analysis.*

## **2. Cross-Strategy Evaluation and the Limits of Asset-Class Thinking**

Institutional investors approach hedge fund allocation from a fundamentally different vantage point than either asset managers or simplified portfolio models. Rather than optimizing standalone risk-adjusted returns, allocators must integrate heterogeneous strategies into a total portfolio governed by investment policy statements, long-term objectives, spending or liability constraints, liquidity requirements, and governance capacity. Hedge fund allocations are therefore evaluated not in isolation, but in terms of how they interact with and influence overall portfolio risk.

In practice, large institutions evaluate a wide spectrum of hedge fund strategies. These include directional equity strategies (long-only, long-biased, and equity long/short), market-neutral and relative-value approaches, event-driven and merger-related strategies, credit-oriented funds (spanning high-yield, distressed debt, and capital-structure arbitrage), macro and trend-following strategies such as global macro and CTAs, quantitative and systematic approaches, multi-strategy platforms, activist and control-oriented funds, emerging-market hedge funds, and fund-of-funds structures (Stulz, 2007). While these strategies are often grouped under a single "hedge fund" allocation, their economic functions — as well as their risk profiles and governance implications — differ materially.

This heterogeneity creates persistent challenges for institutional portfolio construction. Strategy labels convey information about implementation, but they offer limited insight into how a strategy behaves across market regimes, contributes to drawdowns, consumes liquidity, or alters tail outcomes (Fung & Hsieh, 1997). Traditional metrics — including correlation statistics — while useful at a high level, rarely provide sufficient guidance for comparing strategies whose risks are nonlinear, sensitive to the sequence and timing of market events, or contingent on discretionary decision-making.

From an LP perspective, the central question is not whether a hedge fund diversifies equities as measured by traditional metrics, but whether it serves a clearly defined role within the portfolio's risk architecture. Some strategies are intended to moderate directional exposure, others to harvest idiosyncratic risk, others to provide resilience during market dislocations, and others address structural vulnerabilities through governance and control. These distinctions are critical for allocation decisions, yet they are often obscured by asset-class-centric frameworks.

Governance considerations further complicate hedge fund evaluation. Investment committees must be able to articulate why capital is allocated to a given strategy, what risks it is expected to influence, and how success or failure should be judged over time. Liquidity budgets, rebalancing constraints, reputational considerations, and oversight capacity all shape allocation decisions in ways that are not easily captured by optimization models (Ang, 2014). As a result, institutions frequently rely on simplified rules of thumb — such as diversification narratives or peer benchmarks — that inadequately reflect the risks hedge funds are meant to address.

This does not suggest that institutional allocators ignore risk. On the contrary, risk considerations dominate allocation discussions. What is often missing is a framework that explicitly links hedge fund strategies to the specific portfolio risks they are intended to mitigate or deliberately accept. A risk budgeting approach provides such a link by shifting attention from traditional metrics and strategy categories to risk intent and risk contribution, setting the stage for a more coherent integration of hedge funds within institutional portfolios.

### **3. The Limits of Traditional Metric-Based Portfolio Construction**

Correlation has long served as a central organizing concept in portfolio construction and remains a core component of traditional portfolio metrics. Within modern portfolio theory, diversification benefits are largely expressed through the statistical relationship between asset returns, and hedge funds have historically been justified on the basis of low or unstable correlation with traditional asset classes (Markowitz, 1952). While correlation remains a useful descriptive statistic, its application as a primary allocation tool for hedge funds is fundamentally limited.

At a conceptual level, correlation assumes linear, stable relationships between return streams. Many hedge fund strategies, however, are explicitly designed to produce nonlinear and market-condition-dependent payoffs (Fung & Hsieh, 1997; Fung & Hsieh, 2001). Leverage, derivatives, dynamic trading, liquidity transformation, and discretionary decision-making all introduce asymmetries that are poorly captured by correlation coefficients and related linear summary statistics. A strategy may exhibit low correlation in benign environments while becoming highly correlated during periods of market stress, precisely when diversification is most valuable to institutional portfolios.

Empirically, hedge fund correlations are highly sensitive to time horizons, market regimes, reporting practices, and the liquidity of underlying positions. Strategies that rely on illiquid assets or complex instruments may display artificially low correlations due to return smoothing,

reporting lags, or discretionary pricing (Getmansky et al., 2004). Conversely, strategies that actively manage risk may appear correlated during crises because they respond to the same macroeconomic shocks affecting broader markets. In both cases, correlation provides an incomplete and often misleading signal about true economic exposure.

For institutional investors, the consequences of overreliance on traditional metrics are significant. Portfolios constructed to optimize historical correlations may underestimate drawdown risk, misjudge liquidity needs, and allocate capital pro-cyclically — meaning in ways that reinforce recent market cycles rather than anticipate regime transitions. Strategies that appear diversifying ex ante may amplify losses under stress, while strategies designed to mitigate tail risk may be underweighted because their average returns or correlations do not fit conventional optimization frameworks.

More fundamentally, traditional metrics fail to distinguish between strategies that dampen volatility by sacrificing upside, those that provide asymmetric protection during dislocations, those that monetize idiosyncratic risk independent of market direction, or those that reduce risk by altering the governance and decision-making structure of underlying assets. Treating these distinct mechanisms as equivalent simply because they appear similar under traditional metrics fails to capture the economic functions hedge funds perform.

These limitations do not imply that correlation — or traditional quantitative metrics more broadly — should be discarded. Rather, they should be understood as individual dimensions of risk among many. As institutional portfolios become more complex and as hedge fund strategies evolve, a framework that places traditional metrics at the center of allocation decisions is increasingly inadequate. A more robust approach requires shifting the focus from co-movement to risk contribution and risk intent, laying the groundwork for a risk budgeting framework that better reflects institutional objectives.

#### **4. Hedge Funds as Risk-Transforming Tools, Not Asset Classes**

The persistent difficulty institutions face in evaluating hedge funds reflects a deeper classification problem. Hedge funds are typically grouped and compared by strategy labels — such as equity long/short, global macro, or event-driven — rather than by the economic role they play within a portfolio. While these labels describe implementation techniques, they offer limited insight into how a strategy reshapes portfolio risk across market environments.

Reframing hedge funds as risk-transforming tools provides a more coherent foundation for institutional allocation. Unlike traditional asset classes, hedge funds are defined less by the assets they hold than by the discretion they exercise over exposure, timing, leverage, liquidity, and, in some cases, governance. Their distinguishing feature is not performance as measured by traditional metrics, including correlation, but their capacity to alter the distribution of portfolio outcomes.

This reframing aligns naturally with how experienced allocators think about portfolio construction. Institutions do not allocate capital solely to maximize expected returns; they allocate capital to manage uncertainty, preserve flexibility, and ensure the portfolio can withstand adverse scenarios. Hedge funds are one set of tools within this broader risk architecture.

#### **4.1 From strategy labels to economic functions**

Traditional strategy classifications fail to capture meaningful differences in risk behavior. Two funds categorized as equity long/short may differ materially in net exposure, leverage, liquidity profile, and drawdown characteristics (Asness et al., 2001). Conversely, strategies with different labels — such as quantitative equity and discretionary macro — may serve similar functions by providing diversification across regimes or by monetizing volatility.

From an institutional perspective, the relevant question is not how a hedge fund is labeled, but what risk function it serves. Some hedge fund strategies primarily manage directional exposure to markets. Others isolate idiosyncratic risk through relative-value trades. Still others are designed to provide resilience during periods of stress by offering convex payoffs or dynamic risk reduction — meaning returns that improve disproportionately relative to risk taken. These functions cut across traditional categories and are often invisible in correlation-based analysis.

Evaluating hedge funds by economic function also clarifies why conventional benchmarks are frequently unsatisfactory. If a strategy is intended to reduce drawdowns or stabilize portfolio outcomes, measuring success relative to an equity or hedge fund index may be inappropriate. A functional perspective instead evaluates whether the strategy delivers the intended risk transformation within the broader portfolio context.

#### **4.2 Governance as risk mitigation**

A subset of hedge fund strategies illustrates the limitations of asset-class thinking especially well: activist, control-oriented, and special situations strategies that engage directly with corporate governance. These strategies do not primarily seek to manage risk through hedging or diversification, but through governance as risk mitigation.

In these cases, investors identify situations where weak oversight, misaligned incentives, or flawed capital allocation elevate risk at the company level. By acquiring influence or control — through board representation, voting power, or other governance mechanisms — investors seek to reduce uncertainty by reshaping decision rights and strategic direction (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The objective is not to eliminate risk, but to reduce exposure to unmanaged or poorly governed risk.

This approach reflects a broader principle: risk reduction through governance. Effective governance structures, established ex ante, can mitigate the need for reactive intervention. At the same time, the capacity to intervene — through activism or control — is itself a governance mechanism, available when existing structures fail. From an institutional perspective, these

strategies represent a deliberate allocation to governance risk, where outcomes depend on execution, oversight, and long-term value creation rather than market direction alone.

Such risk transformation is poorly captured by traditional metric-based models. Governance-oriented strategies may appear volatile or idiosyncratic in return data, yet their economic purpose is to alter the underlying risk profile of the asset itself. For institutions, recognizing governance as a form of risk mitigation helps clarify why these strategies belong in portfolios despite their complexity and why they require distinct monitoring and evaluation frameworks.

Hedge funds are not best understood as an asset class competing with equities or bonds, but as tools that enable institutions to allocate risk — not just capital — across a broader and more nuanced set of dimensions.

## **5. Risk Budgeting as an Institutional Allocation Framework**

Risk budgeting provides a natural and institutionally coherent framework for integrating hedge funds into diversified portfolios (Litterman, 2003). Rather than allocating capital across asset classes based on expected returns and traditional risk metrics, risk budgeting begins by articulating how much of each type of risk an institution is willing and able to bear. Capital allocation then follows from these risk tolerances, rather than the reverse.

In practice, institutional investors already operate within implicit risk budgets. Spending rules, funded-status targets, drawdown limits, liquidity policies, and leverage constraints all reflect judgments about acceptable risk. However, these judgments are often applied unevenly across asset classes. Traditional assets are evaluated through well-established risk metrics, while hedge funds are frequently assessed through a combination of traditional metrics — including correlation statistics — peer benchmarks, and qualitative narratives that do not map cleanly to portfolio-level objectives.

Risk budgeting addresses this inconsistency by shifting the unit of analysis from assets to risks (Ang, 2014; Ilmanen & Kizer, 2012). Common institutional risk dimensions include volatility risk, drawdown risk, liquidity risk, tail risk, and leverage risk. Each dimension represents a distinct way in which portfolio outcomes can deviate from institutional objectives. Hedge fund strategies interact with these risks in diverse and sometimes counterintuitive ways, making them particularly well suited to a risk-based rather than asset-based framework.

Risk budgeting does not seek to eliminate judgment or discretion. On the contrary, it makes judgment explicit. By requiring institutions to specify which risks are being assumed, mitigated, or transformed, risk budgeting enhances fiduciary clarity and improves accountability. It allows investment committees to evaluate whether a strategy is fulfilling its intended role, rather than whether it has outperformed an index or peer group over an arbitrary period.

Compared with allocation frameworks centered on traditional metrics, risk budgeting offers several advantages. It accommodates nonlinear and market-condition-dependent payoffs, aligns

more closely with institutional governance constraints, and reduces the tendency toward pro-cyclical decision-making. Most importantly, it reframes hedge fund allocation as an intentional exercise in allocating risk — consistent with the way experienced institutions already reason about portfolio resilience.

## **6. Integrating Hedge Fund Strategies into a Risk Budgeting Framework**

Applying a risk budgeting framework to hedge fund allocation requires moving from theoretical support for risk budgeting to practical portfolio implementation. The central task is to identify the specific portfolio risks hedge fund strategies are intended to influence and to assign them accordingly within the institution's overall risk architecture.

### **6.1 Defining portfolio-level risk budgets**

Institutions begin by articulating acceptable ranges for key risks at the total portfolio level. These may include limits on overall volatility, tolerance for peak-to-trough drawdowns, minimum liquidity buffers, and constraints on leverage and complexity. These parameters are shaped not only by financial objectives, but also by governance capacity, regulatory considerations, and stakeholder expectations (Ang, 2014).

Within this structure, hedge fund strategies can be categorized based on whether they primarily absorb risk (such as dampening volatility or drawdowns), redistribute risk across time or market conditions (as seen in trend-following, macro, and tail-risk strategies that seek to perform during periods of market stress), or deliberately introduce certain risks (such as liquidity, leverage, or governance risk) to mitigate others. Some strategies are intended to stabilize portfolio outcomes, while others are designed to provide optionality or to address structural vulnerabilities that cannot be managed through traditional diversification alone.

### **6.2 Mapping strategies to risk budgets**

Rather than evaluating hedge funds by strategy labels alone, institutions can map them to dominant portfolio risk budgets based on their economic function. The table below illustrates how different hedge fund strategies align with dominant portfolio risk budgets, recognizing that individual strategies may span multiple risk dimensions depending on implementation and market context.

**Table 1. Mapping Hedge Fund Strategy Groups to Institutional Risk Budgets**

Strategy Group	Representative Strategies	Volatility Risk	Drawdown Risk	Liquidity Risk	Tail Risk	Governance Risk	Primary Portfolio Role
Directional Equity Exposure	Long-only, long-biased, equity L/S, short-only	●●●	●●○	●○○	●○○	○○○	Directional return modulation
Market Neutral & Relative Value	Market neutral, statistical arb, relative value equity	●●●	●●○	●●○	●○○	○○○	Volatility dampening
Event-Driven & Corporate Actions	Event-driven, merger arb, special situations	●○○	●●○	●●○	●●○	●○○	Idiosyncratic risk harvesting
Credit & Capital Structure	High-yield, distressed debt, FI arb, convert arb	●○○	●●○	●●●	●●○	●○○	Credit-cycle risk exposure
Macro & Trend-Based	Global macro, CTAs, discretionary macro	●●○	●●○	●○○	●●●	○○○	Regime and tail diversification
Quantitative & Systematic	Quant equity, factor strategies, systematic macro	●●○	●●○	●●○	●○○	○○○	Volatility / factor harvesting
Multi-Strategy Platforms	Multi-strategy hedge funds	●●●	●●●	●●○	●●○	●○○	Internal risk netting
Activist & Control-Oriented	Activist, control, board-driven strategies	●○○	●○○	●●○	●●○	●●●	Governance risk substitution
Emerging Markets & Frontier	EM hedge funds (equity, credit, macro)	●●○	●●●	●●●	●●○	●○○	Structural growth & regime risk
Fund of Hedge Funds	FoHFs	●●○	●●○	●●○	●○○	●●●	Risk aggregation & access

**Legend:**

- = **Primary risk budget:** The strategy is intentionally allocated to address this dimension of portfolio risk. This risk is central to the strategy’s economic purpose and expected contribution within the portfolio.
- = **Secondary exposure:** The strategy meaningfully affects this risk dimension, but it is not the primary reason for allocation. This exposure is monitored and accepted as part of the overall risk profile.
- = **Incidental exposure:** The strategy may influence this risk dimension under certain market conditions, but it is neither a core design feature nor a dominant driver of outcomes.
- = **Not a material driver:** The strategy does not meaningfully influence this risk dimension in a way that is relevant for portfolio-level risk budgeting.

Directional equity strategies primarily influence market exposure and drawdown risk (Asness et al., 2001). Market-neutral and relative-value strategies tend to occupy volatility and idiosyncratic risk budgets, aiming to dampen portfolio variability while monetizing dispersion — meaning generating returns from security-specific price differences rather than broad market movements.

Event-driven and merger-related strategies typically involve episodic liquidity and tail risks in exchange for idiosyncratic return opportunities. Credit-oriented strategies — such as high-yield, distressed debt, fixed income arbitrage, and convertible arbitrage — are closely tied to credit cycles and liquidity conditions, often contributing to drawdown and liquidity risk during periods of stress (Fung & Hsieh, 2001). Macro and trend-following strategies, including global macro and CTAs, are frequently used to address regime and tail risks, providing diversification when traditional assets are under pressure.

Quantitative and systematic strategies may harvest volatility or factor premia — returns associated with persistent market characteristics — contributing to liquidity or short-term drawdown risk while improving longer-term portfolio stability. Multi-strategy platforms internalize diversification across multiple risk types, dynamically reallocating capital within a single organizational structure. Fund-of-funds structures aggregate risk across managers and strategies, often serving governance and access functions rather than targeting specific risk exposures.

A distinct category is formed by activist, control-oriented, and governance-focused strategies. These strategies are best understood as occupying a governance risk budget, where outcomes depend on the effectiveness of oversight, engagement, and execution rather than market direction. Their primary function is governance as risk mitigation — reducing unmanaged or poorly governed risk by reshaping decision rights, capital allocation processes, and incentive structures within underlying assets (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).

### **6.3 Governance risk as a distinct portfolio dimension**

Explicitly recognizing governance risk as a portfolio dimension clarifies the institutional role of control-oriented hedge fund strategies. These strategies are not substitutes for equity exposure, nor are they primarily diversifiers in a statistical sense. Instead, they represent a deliberate allocation to risk reduction through governance, where uncertainty is addressed through design, oversight, and, when necessary, intervention.

From a risk budgeting perspective, allocating to governance risk requires different expectations and monitoring practices. Performance is evaluated over longer horizons, with attention to process milestones, strategic outcomes, and cash-flow discipline rather than short-term price movements. Volatility or interim underperformance may be acceptable if the strategy succeeds in mitigating deeper structural risks.

This framework also highlights why strategy labels alone are insufficient. The same hedge fund strategy may occupy different risk budgets depending on implementation, leverage, liquidity, and

governance approach. Risk budgeting accommodates this heterogeneity by focusing on contribution rather than classification, enabling institutions to integrate hedge funds more coherently into the total portfolio.

## **7. Governance, Oversight, and Implementation**

While risk budgeting provides a coherent framework for hedge fund allocation, its effectiveness depends on governance and implementation. Institutional investors must translate portfolio-level risk intent into oversight processes that are understandable to investment committees, enforceable over time, and adaptable to changing market conditions. This translation is often where sound allocation frameworks break down.

A central governance challenge lies in making risk intent explicit. Hedge fund allocations are frequently approved on the basis of diversification narratives or return expectations without clearly specifying which portfolio risks the strategy is meant to mitigate or assume (Stulz, 2007). In such cases, subsequent performance evaluation becomes ambiguous. Strategies may be judged harshly for underperforming during equity rallies despite fulfilling a drawdown-mitigation role or retained despite contributing unintended liquidity or tail risks.

Risk budgeting improves governance by anchoring oversight to risk contribution rather than category performance. Monitoring focuses on whether a strategy behaves consistently with its assigned risk budget across market regimes. A strategy occupying a tail-risk or regime-diversification budget — such as global macro or trend-following strategies — should be evaluated primarily on its behavior during periods of stress, not on its average returns in benign markets. Conversely, strategies designed to harvest idiosyncratic or relative-value opportunities should be assessed on process discipline, exposure management, and drawdown control.

Implementation also requires prioritization. Hedge funds vary significantly in complexity, transparency, and potential impact on portfolio outcomes. Risk budgeting helps institutions allocate oversight resources accordingly. Strategies occupying critical risk budgets — such as liquidity, drawdown, or governance risk — warrant deeper engagement, more frequent review, and clearer escalation pathways.

Compensation and incentive structures must also align with risk intent. Fee arrangements that emphasize short-term performance may conflict with strategies designed to stabilize portfolio outcomes or to achieve long-horizon governance objectives. A risk budgeting framework does not dictate fee levels, but it clarifies what institutions are paying for: not simply returns, but risk mitigation, optionality, and resilience. This clarity strengthens fiduciary accountability and supports more disciplined manager selection and retention decisions.

Risk budgeting reinforces an important governance principle: it does not replace judgment; it structures judgment. By making risk trade-offs explicit and reviewable, institutions improve decision quality without constraining the discretion necessary to manage complex portfolios.

## **8. Institutional Applications and Illustrative Archetypes**

The application of risk budgeting to hedge fund allocation varies across institutional contexts. While the underlying framework is consistent, the composition of risk budgets and the roles assigned to hedge funds depend on each institution's objectives, constraints, and governance capacity. The following illustrative archetypes highlight how the same principles manifest differently across institutional settings.

### **8.1 Endowment- and foundation-style portfolios**

Endowments and foundations typically operate with perpetual time horizons and explicit spending rules, making drawdown control and the consistency of returns over time central concerns. Hedge funds are often used to moderate volatility, preserve capital during market dislocations, and provide diversification across regimes. Strategies occupying volatility, drawdown, and tail-risk budgets may be prioritized over those seeking to maximize returns in rising markets. Success is evaluated not by benchmark outperformance, but by the extent to which hedge funds support spending stability and reduce reliance on pro-cyclical rebalancing.

### **8.2 Pension, insurance, and liability-driven portfolios**

Pension funds and insurance companies face explicit liabilities and funded-status constraints, which shape how risk is defined and managed. Hedge funds in this setting may be deployed to manage equity downside risk, address liquidity needs during market stress, or exploit dislocations in credit markets that align with liability profiles. Risk budgeting enables pensions to evaluate hedge funds based on their impact on funded-status volatility rather than standalone returns, reinforcing a long-term, liability-aware approach to allocation.

### **8.3 Sovereign wealth and official reserve portfolios**

Sovereign wealth funds and official reserve managers often possess long horizons and relatively high risk tolerance, but face unique political, reputational, and liquidity considerations. Hedge funds in this context may occupy risk budgets associated with regime diversification, macroeconomic transitions, or opportunistic deployment during market dislocations. Risk budgeting allows these institutions to integrate hedge funds without over-reliance on tactical timing, evaluating strategies based on their ability to provide flexibility and resilience within otherwise long-term strategic allocation frameworks.

### **8.4 Intermediaries and multi-client allocation platforms**

Intermediaries — including fund of hedge funds, investment consultants, OCIOs, and private banking platforms — do not allocate capital on their own balance sheets. They act on behalf of multiple clients, each with varying objectives, constraints, and governance capacities. Fund of hedge funds internalize diversification across managers and strategies; within a risk budgeting framework, their primary function is managing dispersion, access, and governance complexity rather than optimizing returns. Investment consultants and OCIOs translate institutional risk

intent into scalable allocation policies across multiple client portfolios — risk budgeting provides the common language for communicating why particular strategies are included and how they should be evaluated. Private banking and advisory platforms serving high-net-worth clients and family offices can use risk budgeting to tailor hedge fund allocations to different priorities without defaulting to standardized model portfolios. Across all intermediary contexts, the central challenge is alignment of allocation decisions with client risk capacity and governance constraints.

### **8.5 Governance-oriented and control allocations**

Institutions allocating to activist, control-oriented, and special situations strategies are not seeking diversification as measured by traditional portfolio statistics. They are deliberately allocating to governance as risk mitigation, accepting execution and complexity risk in exchange for greater control over outcomes. In this archetype, hedge funds occupy a governance risk budget, where performance is evaluated over longer horizons and against strategic milestones rather than price movements alone. Interim volatility or illiquidity may be acceptable if the strategy succeeds in reducing unmanaged risk through improved governance, capital discipline, or cash-flow control.

Across these archetypes, the central insight is consistent: hedge funds derive their value from context. The same strategy may be stabilizing in one portfolio and destabilizing in another, depending on how it interacts with existing risk budgets. Risk budgeting makes this context explicit, enabling institutions to deploy hedge funds more intentionally and evaluate them more coherently.

## **9. Implications for Capital Allocation Policy and Practice**

Reframing hedge funds through a risk budgeting lens has important implications for institutional capital allocation policy. Many of the persistent frustrations associated with hedge fund investing — disappointment with returns, confusion around benchmarks, and periodic calls to eliminate hedge fund allocations altogether — can be traced not to flawed strategies, but to misalignment between analytical frameworks and institutional objectives (Stulz, 2007; Ilmanen, 2011). When hedge funds are evaluated primarily as asset classes defined by traditional metrics and relative performance, their contribution to portfolio resilience is easily misunderstood.

A risk budgeting approach shifts the focus from categorization to intent. Rather than asking whether hedge funds outperform equities or diversify bonds, institutions should ask which risks hedge funds are meant to address and whether they do so effectively. This reframing improves decision quality by aligning allocation decisions with fiduciary priorities such as drawdown control, liquidity management, and tail risk mitigation.

For consultants and investment committees, this perspective suggests moving beyond optimization frameworks centered on traditional metrics and peer-relative benchmarking as

primary decision tools. Portfolio construction is strengthened when institutions begin with an explicit articulation of risk tolerances and then allocate strategies accordingly. Hedge funds are incorporated not because they occupy a distinct asset bucket, but because they fulfill specific roles within the portfolio's risk architecture.

Risk budgeting also improves accountability. By clarifying which risks a hedge fund strategy is expected to mitigate or assume, institutions can evaluate performance more coherently over appropriate horizons. Strategies that fail to deliver their intended risk transformation can be reassessed even if headline returns appear acceptable, while strategies that fulfill their role during periods of stress are recognized for their contribution despite modest average performance. This reduces pro-cyclical behavior and supports more disciplined capital allocation.

The framework also provides a consistent lens for evaluating innovation and complexity. As hedge fund strategies evolve — incorporating systematic techniques, alternative data, or governance-driven approaches — risk budgeting enables assessment of new strategies without defaulting to novelty or traditional-metric narratives. Innovations are evaluated based on the risks they introduce, reshape, or mitigate, reinforcing coherence across the portfolio.

Adopting a risk budgeting framework strengthens fiduciary governance. By making risk trade-offs explicit and reviewable, institutions enhance transparency and facilitate meaningful oversight. Investment committees are better equipped to understand why hedge funds are included in the portfolio, how they should behave under stress, and what constitutes success or failure.

## **10. Conclusion**

Hedge funds continue to occupy a contested yet durable position within institutional portfolios. This persistence reflects their ability to address dimensions of risk that traditional asset classes cannot easily manage, rather than their capacity to consistently outperform benchmarks. When evaluated solely through traditional metrics and relative returns, their portfolio-level contribution is often overlooked.

This paper has argued that hedge funds are best understood not just as an asset class, but as risk-transforming tools within institutional portfolios. Their economic value lies in how they reshape portfolio risk through leverage, optionality, liquidity management, and governance mechanisms, rather than in their performance as measured by traditional metrics and return characteristics. Traditional quantitative metrics, while informative, are incomplete and inadequate as a primary organizing principle for hedge fund allocation.

By advancing a risk budgeting framework beyond traditional metrics, the paper offers an alternative lens that aligns more closely with institutional objectives and governance realities. Risk budgeting shifts attention from capital allocation to risk allocation — the intentional distribution of risk across volatility, drawdown, liquidity, tail, and governance dimensions.

Within this framework, hedge funds are evaluated based on the specific risks they are intended to mitigate or assume.

This perspective also reconciles the apparent disconnect between allocator skepticism and continued hedge fund use. Many perceived hedge fund failures are allocation failures, arising from inappropriate benchmarks, unclear risk intent, or misaligned expectations. Explicit risk budgeting improves clarity, enhances accountability, and supports more resilient portfolio construction.

The implications extend beyond hedge funds. As institutional portfolios become more complex — incorporating private markets, systematic strategies, and governance-oriented investments — the limitations of asset-class-centric allocation frameworks become increasingly apparent. Risk budgeting provides a unifying architecture capable of accommodating heterogeneity while preserving fiduciary discipline.

Risk budgeting does not eliminate uncertainty, nor does it replace judgment. Instead, it structures judgment by making risk trade-offs explicit and reviewable. In doing so, it meaningfully improves how institutions think about hedge funds and, more broadly, how they approach capital allocation in an increasingly complex investment landscape.

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